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Precedent, Principle and 
Pragmatism: Justice Wilson and the 
Expansion of Canadian Tort Law 
Kate Sutherland* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tort law does not appear to have been a particular area of interest for 
Bertha Wilson during her years as a law student or in legal practice. But 
after she was appointed to the bench, some of her best-known judgments 
both at the Ontario Court of Appeal and at the Supreme Court of Canada 
were tort decisions (for example, Bhadauria v. Seneca College of 
Applied Arts and Technology1 and Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen),2 and 
they, along with a number of other decisions authored by her, remain 
staples of the tort law curriculum. Clearly Justice Wilson made an 
impact on Canadian tort law.  
This article focuses squarely on her tort decisions, analyzing them as 
a body with a view to determining whether a coherent tort theory or 
philosophy underpins them. At first glance, a thread to connect this body 
of decisions is elusive; indeed, on the surface, a number of them appear 
to contradict one another. For example, based on her Bhadauria 
judgment in which she boldly created a new tort of discrimination, we 
might regard Justice Wilson as a tort expansionist. Yet elsewhere, we see 
her protecting other areas of law from incursion by tort (contract law in 
Dominion Chain v. Eastern Construction Co.3 and family law in Frame 
v. Smith).4 And in other decisions, she positions herself somewhere 
between these poles, championing an incremental expansion of tort law 
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1 [1979] O.J. No. 4475, 27 O.R. (2d) 142, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707 (Ont. C.A.), revd [1981] 
S.C.J. No. 76, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bhadauria”]. 
2 [1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kamloops”]. 
3 [1976] O.J. No. 2104, 12 O.R. (2d) 201, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1978] 
S.C.J. No. 61, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1346 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dominion Chain”]. 
4 [1987] S.C.J. No. 49, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Frame”]. 
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where precedent allows and justice demands (for example, in Kamloops 
and in Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd.).5  
But digging deeper into Justice Wilson’s tort decisions, common 
themes emerge which link them to one another and ground them firmly 
in the broader context of her judicial work as a whole. In tort, as in other 
areas of law, we find Justice Wilson striving to make decisions that are 
respectful of the constraints within which she operated as an appellate 
judge, true to her liberal principles, and responsive to the practical 
concerns of the parties appearing before her. 
II. INITIAL ENCOUNTERS WITH TORT LAW 
Bertha Wilson’s experience as a first-year torts student was 
noteworthy for two reasons. First, it was in that class that she made the 
acquaintance of Dr. William R. Lederman, who became her favourite 
law school professor and an important mentor to her for many years 
thereafter. Second, it was there that she learned an important lesson 
about exam writing that set her on track for the excellence she ultimately 
achieved as a student. In a 1993 tribute to Dr. Lederman, she explained: 
I recall, as a mature first year student many years removed from the 
technique of writing examinations, going to his office to ask why I had 
not done better in the Christmas test in torts. He handed me my paper 
and asked me to read my answer to a question involving a hockey 
player hitting another player during the game with his hockey stick. He 
said “You assumed that I knew that you knew that the tort involved 
was the tort of assault but at no point in your paper did you say so. You 
have to set your answer out step by step from the beginning and after 
you have done that go on to argue the finer points.” I will always be 
grateful for that first interview because it reminded me that in the 
world of examinations nothing is to be taken for granted and 
everything is to be documented. I had no further problems with 
examinations from then on.6 
Nevertheless, tort law does not seem to have become a particular 
area of interest for her at that stage. It was the upper year courses in 
constitutional law and jurisprudence taught by Dr. Lederman more so 
than that first-year torts class that she found especially stimulating. In 
her biography of Justice Wilson, Ellen Anderson describes Justice 
                                                                                                             
5 [1988] S.C.J. No. 60, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Crocker”]. 
6 Bertha Wilson, “The Ideal Teacher” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 16, at 16-17. 
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Wilson’s response to her initial exposure to tort law as an ambivalent 
one: 
There is no question that Wilson found torts conceptually interesting, 
and the method of teaching it generally appropriate. However, she 
considered the case book approach to be too much of a good thing. The 
torts course suffered from the excessive number of cases (some 187) 
with which Dalhousie students were to be familiar for the 
examination.7 
During her 17 years in practice, Justice Wilson developed particular 
expertise in the realm of corporate and commercial law. Doubtless she 
would have encountered tort law occasionally, in the guise of one or 
another of the business torts, or negligence as it intersects with contract 
law. But tort law was not a primary focus for her then either. 
It was only after Justice Wilson ascended to the bench that tort law 
began to figure prominently in her legal work. Not that she penned a vast 
number of tort decisions — in contrast to her constitutional output, for 
example, her tort decisions seem a modest handful.8 But of those tort 
decisions she did pen, both at the Ontario Court of Appeal and at the 
Supreme Court, several were high profile decisions that proved to be of 
long-standing importance.  
III. EARLY JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON TORT: BHADAURIA 
Bhadauria v. Seneca College,9 arguably Justice Wilson’s best-known 
judgment from her tenure on the Court of Appeal, was a tort case. 
Indeed, even after all of her distinguished work at the Supreme Court, I 
would venture to say that Bhadauria remained one of the best-known 
judgments of her judicial career. As such, it deserves sustained attention 
here.  
                                                                                                             
7 Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), at 41 [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”]. 
8 See James MacPherson, “Canadian Constitutional Law and Madame Justice Bertha 
Wilson — Patriot, Visionary and Heretic” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 217, at 222 for a statistical 
picture of Justice Wilson’s constitutional activity on the Supreme Court:  
During her nine years at the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court heard 217 constitutional 
cases. Justice Wilson participated in 188 or 85.7 per cent of these cases. Moreover, she 
wrote judgments in 69 or 36.5 per cent of the cases in which she participated. These 
participation and writing rates are even higher in Charter cases. She participated in 89 per 
cent of the Court’s Charter cases and wrote judgments in 43.6 per cent of the cases in which 
she participated (65:149). 
9 Supra, note 1. 
134 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The plaintiff in the case was a highly educated East Indian woman. 
She held a B.A., an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Mathematics as well as an 
Ontario teaching certificate. She had seven years of experience teaching 
mathematics. During a four-year period she made 10 applications for 
teaching positions at the defendant College, each time in response to 
advertisements placed in Toronto newspapers. Her applications were 
acknowledged but she was never granted an interview, nor provided with 
any reason for the rejection of her applications. She alleged that each 
position was filled by someone who did not have her high qualifications, 
but who was not of East Indian origin. 
The plaintiff alleged that she had been discriminated against in 
contravention of section 4 of the Ontario Human Rights Code,10 which 
prohibited discrimination in employment on grounds of race, creed, 
colour, sex, marital status, nationality, ancestry or place of origin. She 
declined to file a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, 
instead bringing an action in tort. She claimed damages for deprivation of 
teaching opportunities and of a teaching salary. Further, she claimed 
damages for mental distress, frustration, loss of self-esteem and dignity 
arising from the discriminatory treatment to which she had been subjected. 
These claims were grounded in two separate causes of action. First, 
the plaintiff argued that the respondent College had breached a common 
law duty not to discriminate against her. Second, it had breached a 
statutory duty not to discriminate that flowed from its breach of the 
Ontario Human Rights Code. Writing for a unanimous court, Wilson J. 
found for the plaintiff based on the common law cause of action.  
She noted that, “[w]hile no authority . . . has recognized a tort of 
discrimination, none has repudiated such a tort”,11 then quoted the 
following passage from Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts: 
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development 
are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are 
entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the 
mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the 
remedy.12 
She cited the preamble to the Ontario Human Rights Code as 
evidence of the public policy of the province regarding human rights, 
                                                                                                             
10 R.S.O. 1970, c. 318. 
11 Bhadauria, supra, note 1, at 149 O.R. (C.A.). 
12 Id. 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)  PRECEDENT, PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM 135 
particularly equality, but not as the originator of such public policy.13 
She held that the right to equality ought to receive the full protection of 
the common law, and that tort recovery for discrimination provided 
appropriate protection. She did not regard the Code as impeding the 
development of such a remedy, but rather the reverse given that relief 
under it is dependent on Ministerial discretion.14 Thus, a new common 
law tort of discrimination was born. 
The decision was widely lauded.15 Mr. Justice Allen Linden, a 
renowned tort scholar and professor before his appointment to the bench, 
indicated that he had been delighted by it and that others were “dancing 
in the streets”.16 This seems no hyperbole when we consider such 
contemporaneous responses as that of civil rights lawyer Joseph 
Pomerant, who deemed it “the most important decision for the little guy 
on the street in the history of this country”17 and academic Dale Gibson, 
who pronounced it “a blessed event”.18  
Alas, the reception by the Supreme Court was not so positive; a year 
and a half later, Bhadauria was overturned on appeal. Chief Justice 
Laskin (as he then was) expressed puzzlement at Wilson J.’s observation 
that “while the fundamental human right we are concerned with is 
recognized by the Code, it was not created by it”.19 He could see little 
difference between the common law and statutory causes of action put 
forward by the plaintiff, viewing the common law argument as an 
attempt to found a new action at common law “by reference to policies 
reflected in the statute and standards fixed by the statute”.20 The case, for 
him, “[was] not concerned with whether a remedy can be provided for an 
admitted right but whether there is a right at all, that is, an interest which 
                                                                                                             
13 Id., at 149-50 O.R. 
14 Id., at 150 O.R. 
15 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 7, at 121-24; Dale Gibson, “The New Tort of 
Discrimination: A Blessed Event for the Great-Grandmother of Torts” (1980) 11 C.C.L.T. 141 
[hereinafter “‘The New Tort of Discrimination’”]; Maureen E. Baird, “Pushpa Bhadauria v. The 
Board of Governors of The Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology: A Case Comment” 
(1981) 39 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 96; Ian A. Hunter, “The Stillborn Tort of Discrimination: Bhadauria v. 
Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology” (1982) 14 Ottawa L. Rev. 
222; and Harry Kopyto, “The Bhadauria Case: The Denial of the Right to Sue for Discrimination” 
(1981) 7 Queen’s L.J. 162. 
16 Judging Bertha Wilson, id., at 124. 
17 Cited id., at 121. 
18 “The New Tort of Discrimination”, supra, note 15, at 150. 
19 Bhadauria, supra, note 1, at 192. 
20 Id., at 188. 
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the law will recognize as deserving protection”.21 He characterized the 
tort recognized by the Court of Appeal as “a species of an economic tort, 
new in its instance and founded, even if indirectly, on a statute enacted 
in an area outside a fully recognized area of common law duty”.22 
Chief Justice Laskin stated that “while the view taken by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal [was] a bold one and may be commended as an attempt 
to advance the common law”, such an attempt was “foreclosed by the 
legislative initiative which overtook the existing common law in Ontario 
and established a different regime”.23 He held that, in the Human Rights 
Code, the legislature of Ontario had created a comprehensive scheme “in 
its administrative and adjudicative features, the latter including a wide 
right of appeal to the Courts on both fact and law”.24 He concluded that 
“not only does the Code foreclose any civil action based directly upon a 
breach thereof but it also excludes any common law action based on an 
invocation of the public policy expressed in the Code”.25 
Despite this prompt reversal, Justice Wilson’s Court of Appeal 
decision in Bhadauria has generated continuing interest and enthusiasm 
among activists and academics, some of whom have expressed hope that 
the entrenchment of a constitutional right to equality in the intervening 
years would dictate a different result should the Supreme Court be called 
upon to consider anew the possibility of a common law tort of 
discrimination.26  
Justice Wilson’s decision in Bhadauria was undoubtedly an 
important event in her judicial career. Ellen Anderson goes so far as to 
suggest that it was one of the factors that elevated her name to the top of 
the list of potential appointees to the Supreme Court in 1982. She 
recounts an exchange that occurred between Allen Linden and then 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau just prior to her appointment. Trudeau, 
who was seeking to identify a female candidate who would make a 
credible appointment to the as yet all-male court, asked Linden for his 
                                                                                                             
21 Id., at 192. 
22 Id., at 189. 
23 Id., at 195. 
24 Id., at 183. 
25 Id., at 195. 
26 See, for example, Kate Sutherland, “The New Equality Paradigm: The Impact of Charter 
Equality Rights on Private Law Decisions” in D. Schneiderman & K. Sutherland, eds., Charting the 
Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Law and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1997); Jeffrey Radnoff & Pamela Foy, “The Tort of Discrimination” (2002) 26 
Advoc. Q. 311; and Gillian Demeyere, “Common Law Actions for Sexual Harassment: The 
Jurisdiction Question Revisited” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 637. 
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views on Justice Wilson. Trudeau was already aware of her solid 
reputation in commercial law, but looking ahead to the impending 
coming into force of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,27 he 
wanted to know about her record on human rights and civil liberties. 
Anderson describes Linden’s response to the query and the events that 
followed thus: 
In Linden’s opinion, Wilson was supremely competent in commercial 
law but her heart was in human rights; there could be no one finer. 
Trudeau was not familiar with the Wilson judgment in Bhadauria; 
when Linden described it to him, he requested that Linden forward a 
copy of it to him. Within a few days, the Wilson appointment had been 
announced.28 
The fact that Justice Wilson’s Bhadauria decision had made an 
impression on Trudeau and his government was underscored by a 
playful mention of it by then Justice Minister Jean Chrétien at her 
swearing-in ceremony: 
Although I know that Madame Justice Wilson will work closely with 
her new associates, her service on the Court of Appeal demonstrates 
that she will not hesitate to write clearly and compellingly in dissent. 
My Lord the Chief Justice has been recently aware of the persuasive 
innovation which his new associate can bring to her judgments, and in 
the future, he may find it more difficult to resist the kind of reasoning 
which he recently characterized as a bold and commendable attempt to 
advance the common law.29 
Justice Wilson’s Bhadauria decision does seem to have augured 
things to come when we think of the reputation she went on to develop 
at the Supreme Court for creative judgments responsive to equality 
concerns, particularly in the realm of Charter jurisprudence. But what 
does Bhadauria tell us about her tort philosophy? Did it hold any 
predictive power with respect to her future tort decisions?  
IV. TO EXPAND OR NOT TO EXPAND TORT LAW 
Based on her bold creation of a new tort of discrimination in 
Bhadauria, we might be tempted to label Justice Wilson a tort 
                                                                                                             
27 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
28 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 7, at 125. 
29 Cited id., at 129. 
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expansionist and to anticipate that in future judgments she would create 
other new torts to protect other legal interests. In fact, however, 
analyzing her tort decisions as a body, the picture becomes much more 
complicated. Both before and after Bhadauria,30 she was as likely to put 
the brakes on tort expansion as to further it.  
Early in her tenure at the Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice Wilson 
registered dissents in a pair of cases, Dominion Chain and Dabous v. 
Zuliani,31 that,  
. . . raise[d] the question of whether a contractor on the one hand, and 
an architect or engineer on the other hand, who have both been 
negligent in the performance of their respective contracts with a 
plaintiff for the construction of a building by the contractor and for the 
supervision of such construction by the architect or engineer, have 
rights under the Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 296, of contribution 
and indemnity against one another.32  
The majority held that the contractor and the architect or engineer in that 
scenario owed tort duties that overlapped with the contractual 
obligations that they had taken upon themselves; as a consequence they 
did constitute tortfeasors within the meaning of the Negligence Act and 
so had rights under it of contribution and indemnity against one another.  
Justice Wilson disagreed with the majority on the issue of contract/ 
tort overlap, opining that “where the architect or engineer has been 
negligent in the performance of his contractual obligations to the owner, 
the owner’s suit should properly be brought in contract.”33 She continued: 
We are not in my view concerned here with the duty of a defendant not 
to injure his “neighbour” as defined by Lord Atkin in M’Alister (or 
Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 at p. 580. It is true that if A 
has contracted with B to perform certain acts in relation to B’s person 
or property, then B may be characterized as a member of a class of 
“persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I 
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected 
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called 
in question”. However, where the person to whom the duty is owed, 
the scope of the duty and the standard of care have all been expressly 
or impliedly agreed upon by the parties, it appears to me somewhat 
                                                                                                             
30 Supra, note 1. 
31 Dominion Chain, supra, note 3 (C.A.); Dabous v. Zuliani, [1976] O.J. No. 2105, 12 O.R. 
(2d) 230, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 414 (Ont. C.A.). 
32 Dominion Chain, id., at 204-205 O.R.  
33 Id., 223 O.R. 
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artificial to rely upon Lord Atkin’s “neighbour” test to determine 
whether or not the duty is owed to the particular plaintiff and as to the 
requisite standard of care the defendant must attain. In other words, it 
would appear that if the acts or omissions complained of by the 
plaintiff are in relation to the very matters covered by the contract, the 
essence of the plaintiff’s action is breach of the contractual duty of care 
rather than breach of the general duty of care owed to one’s 
“neighbour” in tort.34 
She noted that the scope of the duty owed and the remedies available 
for breach may be different in contract and in tort, and made clear that 
she regarded it as an undesirable outcome that parties to a contract 
should recoup in tort damages that they were not entitled to under that 
contract: “In my view, the provisions of the contract must govern in such 
circumstances. I do not believe, for example, that a plaintiff, by framing 
his action in tort, can allege a higher standard of care than that agreed 
upon by the parties themselves.”35 
Initially I tried to make sense of the apparent disjunction between 
Justice Wilson’s Bhadauria and Dominion Chain judgments by 
reference to the following well-known passage from her 1990 “Will 
Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” speech: 
Taking from my own experience as a judge of fourteen years’ standing, 
working closely with my male colleagues on the bench, there are 
probably whole areas of the law on which there is no uniquely 
feminine perspective. This is not to say that the development of the law 
in these areas has not been influenced by the fact that lawyers and 
judges have all been men. Rather, the principles and the underlying 
premises are so firmly entrenched and so fundamentally sound that no 
good would be achieved by attempting to re-invent the wheel, even if 
the revised version did have a few more spokes in it. I have in mind 
areas such as the law of contract, the law of real property, and the law 
applicable to corporations. In some other areas of the law, however, a 
distinctly male perspective is clearly discernible. It has resulted in legal 
principles that are not fundamentally sound and that should be revisited 
when the opportunity presents itself. Canadian feminist scholarship has 
done an excellent job of identifying those areas and making 
suggestions for reform. Some aspects of the criminal law in particular 
cry out for change; they are based on presuppositions about the nature 
                                                                                                             
34 Id., at 224 O.R. 
35 Id. 
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of women and women’s sexuality that, in this day and age, are little 
short of ludicrous.36 
There is no explicit mention of it here, but given the diverse terrain that 
tort law encompasses, it seems bound to straddle the divide Justice 
Wilson constructed between those areas of the law that ought to be left 
alone and those that cry out for reform.  
Thus we could imagine Justice Wilson regarding the tort/contract 
overlap issue of Dominion Chain as falling within the “firmly 
entrenched” and “fundamentally sound” realm of contract and requiring 
no reform through tort expansion, whereas the damages suffered as a 
consequence of discrimination in Bhadauria would seem an obvious site 
for innovative tort remedies. But an analysis that links in straightforward 
fashion Justice Wilson’s openness to tort expansion with areas of the law 
that she identified as ripe for feminine/feminist reform does not hold up 
when we factor in more of her Supreme Court tort decisions. For 
example, in Frame v. Smith,37 she declined to expand tort remedies in the 
family law context, an area that would certainly fall on the “ripe for 
reform” side of her ledger. 
In Frame, the plaintiff brought an action against his ex-wife and her 
new husband, alleging that they had done everything that they could to 
frustrate his court-ordered access to his three children, ultimately 
destroying his relationship with them. He claimed that the defendants’ 
conduct had put him to considerable expense and also caused him 
extreme mental distress. He sought damages from them for their 
interference with his legal relationship with his children. The 
defendants’ application to strike succeeded at trial and was, in turn, 
upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Justice Wilson dissented in the result, but agreed with the majority 
that there should be no recovery in tort for this plaintiff. She noted that 
the facts of the case could fit within the existing tort of conspiracy and 
that precedent did not preclude the extension of the tort into the family 
law context. But, she asserted, the real question is not whether the tort 
could be extended to cover this scenario, but whether it should be 
extended. Despite her sympathy for the plaintiff, she concluded that it 
should not:  
                                                                                                             
36 Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 507. 
37 Frame, supra, note 4. 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)  PRECEDENT, PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM 141 
It would be my view that the tort of conspiracy should not be extended 
to the family law context. Although “the law concerning the scope of 
the tort of conspiracy is far from clear” the criticisms which have been 
levelled at the tort give good reason to pause before extending it 
beyond the commercial context”.38  
Further: “Having regard to the overriding concern for the best interests 
of the children, I am not persuaded that the tort of conspiracy should be 
extended to encompass the claim of the plaintiff.”39 
For similar reasons, Wilson J. was no more inclined to extend the 
tort of intentional infliction of mental distress to cover the plaintiff’s 
claim: 
Finally, and most importantly, the extension of this cause of action to 
the custody and access context would not appear to be in the best 
interests of children. Like the tort of conspiracy the tort of intentional 
infliction of mental suffering would be relatively ineffective in 
encouraging conduct conducive to the maintenance and development 
of a relationship between both parents and their children. It is obvious 
also that such a cause of action, if it were made available throughout 
the family law context, would have the same potential for petty and 
spiteful litigation and, perhaps worse, for extortionate and vindictive 
behaviour as the tort of conspiracy. Indeed, the tort of intentional 
infliction of mental suffering appears to be an ideal weapon for spouses 
who are undergoing a great deal of emotional trauma which they 
believe is maliciously caused by the other spouse. It is not for this 
Court to fashion an ideal weapon for spouses whose initial, although 
hopefully short-lived objective, is to injure one another, especially 
when this will almost inevitably have a detrimental effect on the 
children. Yet, if this cause of action were extended to encompass the 
facts of this case, it seems to me that there is no rational basis upon 
which its extension to other areas of family law could be resisted. The 
gist of the tort is the intentional infliction of mental suffering 
regardless of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. It would 
be available in respect of all inter-spousal conduct both before and 
after marital breakdown. I would therefore not extend this common law 
tort to the family law context where the spin-off effects on the children 
could only be harmful.40 
                                                                                                             
38 Id., at 124. 
39 Id., at 126-27. 
40 Id., at 128-29. 
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Finally, Wilson J. indicated that a new tort to remedy violation of 
parental access rights was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bhadauria. Given the foregoing, however, I think it is safe to say that 
she would not have been inclined to create such a tort even if she 
believed that precedent left room to do so. It is not that she was reluctant 
to extend tort liability when she thought it appropriate, but rather that she 
did not think it appropriate in this context. Although she had sympathy 
for the plaintiff and judged him to have suffered a compensable loss, she 
was not convinced that the individualized relief provided by tort law was 
the right way to address that loss.  
Instead, she looked to the cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty for a remedy, and here parted way with the majority of the Court, 
who denied the plaintiff’s appeal altogether. She opted for fiduciary duty 
over tort because, in her view, to do so would afford the Court the 
flexibility to give the best interests of the child paramount importance: 
Finally, unlike the causes of action in tort, the cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty allows the court to take into account conduct 
of a non-custodial parent (whether related to custody and access issues 
or not) which might be contrary to the best interests of children. When 
considering breaches of equitable duty and awarding equitable 
remedies the court has a wide scope for the exercise of discretion 
which does not exist in respect of common law causes of action. In the 
context of breach of fiduciary duty this discretion would allow the 
court to deny relief to an aggrieved party or grant relief on certain 
terms if that party’s conduct has disabled him or her from full relief, 
e.g., non-payment of spousal support or previous abuse of access 
rights. There is neither precedent nor historical basis for the exercise of 
such a discretion in the case of a common law tort action. The tort 
would be actionable regardless of the inequitable conduct of the 
plaintiff.41 
The extension of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty that 
Wilson J. proposed in her Frame dissent would have been an innovative 
move,42 so her reluctance to expand the reach of tort law in the case 
                                                                                                             
41 Id., at 144. 
42 On this point, see Mary Jane Mossman, “The ‘Family’ in the Work of Madame Justice 
Wilson” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 115, at 146, n. 88: 
It should also be noted that Justice Wilson’s conclusion that a custodial parent has a 
fiduciary obligation in relation to the non-custodial parent and the children is remarkable for 
its destruction of the public/private division in law. None of the literature cited in her 
judgment applied the fiduciary concept to family relationships; this analysis was her work 
alone. 
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cannot be regarded as a cautious turn prompted by the Supreme Court 
reception of her Court of Appeal decision in Bhadauria. Nor can it be 
seen simply as a reflection of her doubts about the tort of conspiracy. For 
a few years later, in Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.,43 we find her expressing 
an openness to the extension of that tort in a different factual context. 
The plaintiff in Hunt brought an action against the defendants after 
developing mesothelioma. He alleged that this medical condition was the 
result of his exposure to asbestos fibres in the course of his employment, 
and that the defendants, all companies involved in the mining, 
production and supply of asbestos and asbestos products, had known of 
the dangers of such exposure at the time and that they had withheld 
information about those dangers. His action was founded exclusively in 
the tort of conspiracy and the defendants moved to have the action struck 
for want of a reasonable claim. The defendants were successful in having 
the action struck out at trial, but the Court of Appeal overturned that 
decision and the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal. 
In their arguments, the defendants placed considerable weight on the 
portion of Wilson J.’s judgment in Frame in which she expressed doubts 
about expanding the tort of conspiracy and declined to do so in the 
family law context.44 But Wilson J., writing for a unanimous Court this 
time around, was not willing to concede that it would be equally 
inappropriate to extend the tort of conspiracy to cover the facts of Hunt, 
at least not in the context of an application to strike a statement of claim: 
Is it plain and obvious that allowing this action to proceed amounts to 
an abuse of process? I do not think so. While there has clearly been 
judicial reluctance to extend the scope of the tort beyond the 
commercial context, I do not think this Court has ever suggested that 
the tort could not have application in other contexts. … While courts 
should pause before extending the tort beyond its existing confines, 
careful consideration might conceivably lead to the conclusion that the 
tort has a useful role to play in new contexts. 
I note that in Frame v. Smith, supra, at p. 125, I was not prepared to 
extend the tort of conspiracy to the custody and access context both 
because such an extension was not in the best interests of children and 
because such an extension would not have been consistent with the 
rationale that underlies the tort of conspiracy: “namely that the tort be 
                                                                                                             
43 [1990] S.C.J. No. 93, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunt”]. 
44 Remember that though hers was a dissenting judgment the majority agreed with her on 
this point. Frame, [1987] S.C.J. No. 49, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, at 109 (S.C.C.). 
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available where the fact of combination creates an evil which does not 
exist in the absence of combination”. But in the appeal now before us it 
seems to me much less obvious that a similar conclusion would 
necessarily be reached. If the facts as alleged by the plaintiff are true, 
and for the purposes of this appeal we must assume that they are, then 
it may well be that an agreement between corporations to withhold 
information about a toxic product might give rise to harm of a 
magnitude that could not have arisen from the decision of just one 
company to withhold such information. There may, accordingly, be 
good reason to extend the tort to this context.45 
She concluded therefore that it was not “plain and obvious” that the 
plaintiff had no chance of success and so his action should be allowed to 
proceed to trial.  
Thus in the quartet of Wilson J.’s tort decisions that we have 
considered so far, we see a bold expansion of tort law in Bhadauria,46 
and an openness to future expansion in Hunt,47 contrasted with the 
expression of firm convictions in her dissents in Dominion Chain48 and 
Frame49 that the incursion of negligence into contract law and of the tort 
of conspiracy into family law respectively should be stopped cold. More 
often though, what we see in her Supreme Court judgments is an 
incremental expansion of tort law, such as in Kamloops,50 Crocker51 and 
Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co.52 
Justice Wilson’s majority judgment in Kamloops is best known by 
contemporary torts students as an authoritative pronouncement that the 
House of Lord’s two-stage Anns test for determining the existence of a 
duty of care in negligence was duly adopted into Canadian law. But at 
the time it was handed down, it was hailed for important developments 
in three areas of negligence law: (1) liability of public authorities; (2) 
liability for pure economic loss; and (3) the time at which the statutory 
                                                                                                             
45 Hunt, supra, note 43, at 988-89. 
46 [1979] O.J. No. 4475, 27 O.R. (2d) 142, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707 (Ont. C.A.), revd [1981] 
S.C.J. No. 76, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.). 
47 Supra, note 43. 
48 [1970] O.J. No. 2104, 12 O.R. (3d) 201, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1978] 
S.C.J. No. 61, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1346 (S.C.C.). 
49 [1987] S.C.J. No. 49, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.). 
50 [1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). 
51 [1988] S.C.J. No. 60, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186 (S.C.C.). 
52 [1990] S.C.J. No. 121, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fletcher”]. 
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limitation period begins to run in cases in which damage is caused by 
latent defects.53 
The issue in Kamloops was “whether a municipality can be held 
liable for negligence in failing to prevent the construction of a house 
with defective foundations”.54 Justice Wilson, writing for a majority of 
the Court, concluded that it could: 
. . . [T]he evidence gives rise to a strong inference that the City, with 
full knowledge that the work was progressing in violation of the by-
law and that the house was being occupied without a permit, dropped 
the matter because one of its aldermen was involved. Having regard to 
the fact that we are here concerned with a statutory duty and that the 
plaintiff was clearly a person who should have been in the 
contemplation of the City as someone who might be injured by any 
breach of that duty, I think this is an appropriate case for the 
application of the principle in Anns.55 
In arriving at this conclusion, Wilson J. considered unresolved 
questions relating to each of the areas of negligence law listed above. 
With respect to the liability of public authorities, she found that the 
decision at issue here was an operational one and so imposing a duty in 
relation to it would not compromise the municipality’s discretion to 
make policy decisions.56 Further, though the duty was a positive one, 
given that it was a duty that the municipality had elected to impose on 
the building inspector, it made no sense to draw a distinction between 
nonfeasance and misfeasance.57 Finally, she concluded that the imposition 
of liability in these circumstances would not lead to indeterminate 
liability.58 On the question of liability for pure economic loss, she 
determined that the Court’s prior decision on this issue in Rivtow59 did 
not preclude such liability here, given the factual distinctions between 
the cases, in particular the lack of contractual overtones in Kamloops.60 
                                                                                                             
53 See, for example, Beth Bilson, “Should City Hall Be Worried? City of Kamloops v. 
Nielsen” (1984) 49 Sask. L. Rev. 345; and Bruce Feldthusen, “City of Kamloops v. Nielsen: A 
Comment on the Supreme Court’s Modest Clarification of Colonial Tort Law” (1985) 30 McGill 
L.J. 539. 
54 Kamloops, supra, note 50, at 5. 
55 Id., at 24. 
56 Id., at 12-13. 
57 Id., at 24. 
58 Id., at 25-26. 
59 Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, [1973] S.C.J. No. 126, [1974] S.C.R. 
1189 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rivtow”]. 
60 Kamloops, supra, note 50, at 33-35. 
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On the question of when the limitation period should begin to run, 
Wilson J. canvassed two conflicting lines of cases and, in contrast to the 
House of Lords, embraced the reasonable discoverability rule, that is, 
that the limitation period should begin to run not when the damage 
occurs but rather at the point when it is reasonably discoverable by the 
plaintiff. In adopting the reasonable discoverability rule over the 
alternative, Wilson J. emphasized “the injustice of a law which statute-
bars a claim before the plaintiff is even aware of its existence”.61 
Justice Wilson’s statements in Kamloops on the liability of public 
authorities and liability for pure economic loss represent incremental 
changes in tort law that the Court would build upon to formulate the 
more authoritative pronouncements on each issue to be found in later 
decisions such as Just62 and Norsk,63 while the adoption of the reasonable 
discoverability rule was a more dramatic development that paved the 
way for such future innovations as the decision of the Court in M. (K.) v. 
M. (H.).64 
Incremental expansion was also the order of the day in Crocker, 
where the Court was called upon to determine whether the defendant ski 
resort “had a positive duty at law to take certain steps to prevent a 
visibly intoxicated person from competing in the resort’s dangerous 
‘tubing’ competition”.65 Writing for the majority, Wilson J. held that it 
did, and that so holding followed logically from the Court’s previous 
determination in Menow v. Jordan House66 that a tavern owed a duty in 
negligence to an intoxicated patron that “required the defendant to take 
certain positive steps to avert potential calamity”.67 In her view it was a 
short step from the facts of Menow to those of Crocker:  
. . . [W]hen a hotel ejects a drunken patron, it owes a duty of care to the 
patron to take certain steps to ensure that the patron arrives home 
safely (Jordan House). It would seem a fortiori that when a ski resort 
establishes a competition in a highly dangerous sport and runs the 
                                                                                                             
61 Id., at 40. 
62 Just v. British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 121, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 (S.C.C.). 
63 Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] S.C.J. No. 40, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 (S.C.C.). 
64 [1992] S.C.J. No. 85, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (S.C.C.). 
65 Crocker, supra, note 51, at 1188. 
66 [1973] S.C.J. No. 80, [1974] S.C.R. 239 (S.C.C.). 
67 Crocker, supra, note 51, at 1196. 
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competition for profit, it owes a duty of care towards visibly 
intoxicated participants.68 
Indeed, Wilson J. concluded that the risk of harm was even greater 
in the latter case than in the former. 
Finally, in Fletcher,69 the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether public insurers owe duties in negligence to their clients. The 
plaintiffs suffered serious injuries in a car accident. The driver of the 
other car was judged responsible but did not have sufficient insurance to 
cover the plaintiffs’ losses so the plaintiffs claimed the shortfall from the 
defendant public insurer. The defendant denied the claim because the 
plaintiffs had not purchased optional “underinsured motorist coverage”. 
The plaintiffs then sued the defendants in negligence alleging that they 
had not been properly informed of the full range of coverage available to 
them at the time that they purchased their insurance package. The trial 
judge found for the plaintiffs but the Court of Appeal allowed the 
defendant’s appeal. 
Justice Wilson, writing for a unanimous Court, restored the trial 
judgment in favour of the plaintiff. In so doing, she endorsed the English 
and Canadian cases that had already held insurance agents to have duties 
to their clients under the Hedley Byrne principle, stating: 
In my view, the sale of automobile insurance is a business in the course 
of which information is routinely provided to prospective customers in 
the expectation that they will rely on it and who do in fact reasonably 
rely on it. It follows, therefore, that the principle in Hedley Byrne 
applies and that MPIC will owe a duty of care to its customers if: (i) 
such customers rely on the information, (ii) their reliance is reasonable, 
and (iii) MPIC knew or ought to have known that they would rely on 
the information.70 
Of private insurers, she said the following: 
In my view, it is entirely appropriate to hold private insurance agents 
and brokers to a stringent duty to provide both information and advice 
to their customers. They are, after all, licensed professionals who 
specialize in helping clients with risk assessment and in tailoring 
insurance policies to fit the particular needs of their customers. Their 
service is highly personalized, concentrating on the specific 
circumstances of each client. Subtle differences in the forms of 
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coverage available are frequently difficult for the average person to 
understand. Agents and brokers are trained to understand these 
differences and to provide individualized insurance advice. It is both 
reasonable and appropriate to impose upon them a duty not only to 
convey information but also to provide counsel and advice.71 
Turning her mind to the question of the scope of the duties owed by 
public insurers, she concluded that circumstances dictate that they not be 
quite so onerous. Nevertheless, she found that they did owe duties to 
inform clients of the available range of insurance and that the defendant 
had failed to meet that duty on the facts of the case.72 
Thus we can see from the foregoing that Justice Wilson’s tort 
decisions swing from the pole of bold expansion on the one hand to that 
of a decisive halting of tort incursion into other areas of the law on the 
other, with many stops in between for varying degrees of incremental 
tort reform. Clearly, giving in to the temptation to focus on her most 
dramatic tort innovation and attempting to ascribe to her an overarching 
tort philosophy on that basis would be a mistake.  
Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson has said of Justice Wilson’s 
judicial work more broadly:  
It is of course fairly easy to track the way in which Bertha Wilson 
redrew boundaries or incorporated new ideas into existing methods of 
analysis. But the less obvious and more difficult exercise, yet one that 
is equally important, is to understand why she stopped at any given 
point and why in some instances she chose not to realign particular 
frontiers.73 
Given the subtleties of many of her tort decisions, this seems precisely the 
sort of exercise that is required to come to grips with the values that 
underpin them and what, if any, tort philosophy they add up to. 
V. COMMON THEMES AND UNDERLYING VALUES 
Although an overarching tort philosophy is not immediately 
apparent in Justice Wilson’s judgments, a careful analysis of her tort 
decisions does reveal a series of recurring themes and underlying values 
that unite them. I have grouped these themes and values loosely under 
                                                                                                             
71 Id., at 217. 
72 Id., at 217-18. 
73 Brian Dickson, “Madame Justice Wilson: Trailblazer for Justice” (1992) 15 Dalhousie 
L.J. 1, at 9 [hereinafter “‘Trailblazer for Justice’”]. 
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the overlapping labels of precedent, principle and pragmatism.74 Below I 
will discuss what these labels are intended to denote and which aspects 
of Wilson J.’s tort decisions I associate with each.  
1. Precedent 
I am using the term “precedent” here as an alliterative shorthand to 
refer not just to Justice Wilson’s adherence to the doctrine of precedent, 
but to the respect that she accorded to the whole constellation of 
constraints within which appellate judges operate. Among these, 
alongside the doctrine of precedent, I would highlight the emphasis she 
placed on showing deference to the findings of fact of trial judges and 
also deference to the legislature when she judged it a more appropriate 
vehicle for legal reform. 
Justice Wilson accorded respect to these constraints not simply as a 
matter of form but because she believed that they served an important 
function. On this topic, Justice Dickson has said: “[I]t has long seemed 
to me that one can only begin to appreciate [Bertha Wilson’s] 
contribution fully if one recognizes that underlying her work is a 
sophisticated vision both of the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
our constitutional democracy and of the implications of that role for the 
constraints within which a judge must operate.”75 Just as she did not 
hesitate to rein in other branches of government when she judged them 
to have exceeded their authority in, for example, violating Charter rights, 
she reined herself in by respecting the limits of her own judicial role as 
she conceived it. 
Her reputation as a judicial activist notwithstanding, Justice 
Wilson’s judgments are replete with references to prior Supreme Court 
decisions; she did not depart from past authority lightly. For example, in 
Kamloops she raised questions about the Court’s Rivtow decision on 
pure economic loss, noting that the House of Lords had recently 
expressed a preference for the approach adopted by Laskin J. over that 
                                                                                                             
74 In formulating these categories, I have been influenced by Philip Bryden’s articulation of 
Justice Wilson’s characteristics as a judge in “The Democratic Intellect: The State in the Work of 
Madame Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 65, at 68-71 [hereinafter “‘The Democratic 
Intellect’”], and also by Justice Wilson’s own identification of a series of tensions in judicial 
decision-making in “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227. 
75 “Trailblazer for Justice”, supra, note 73, at 6. See also “The Democratic Intellect”, id., at 
68 and 77. 
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adopted by the majority in the case.76 But rather than revisiting it, she 
distinguished the facts of Kamloops, leaving any doubts swirling round 
Rivtow for another day: “In any event, the majority judgment of this 
Court in Rivtow stands until such time as it may be reconsidered by a full 
panel of the Court.”77  
She also paid careful consideration to the pronouncements of other 
influential courts such as the House of Lords, but without being unduly 
deferential to them. For example, again in Kamloops, this time on the 
issue relating to limitation periods, she fully canvassed the arguments in 
favour of the approach adopted by the House of Lords in Pirelli,78 but 
ultimately judged the opposing arguments in favour of the reasonable 
discoverability rule more persuasive, stating simply: “This Court is in the 
happy position of being free to adopt or reject Pirelli. I would reject it.”79 
There are a number of instances in Justice Wilson’s tort judgments 
in which she emphasized the importance of deferring to the factual 
determinations made by trial judges.80 One of the most definitive can be 
found in Fletcher:  
These authorities, in my view, make crystal clear the test for 
determining when it is appropriate for an appellate court to depart from 
a trial judge’s findings of fact: appellate courts should only interfere 
where the trial judge has made a “palpable and overriding error which 
affected his assessment of the facts.” The very structure of our judicial 
system requires this deference to the trier of fact. Substantial resources 
are allocated to the process of adducing evidence at first instance and 
we entrust the crucial task of sorting through and weighing that 
evidence to the person best placed to accomplish it. As this Court and 
the House of Lords have repeatedly emphasized, it is the trial judge 
who is in the best position to assess the credibility of testimony. An 
appellate court should not depart from the trial judge’s conclusions 
concerning the evidence “merely on the result of their own comparisons 
and criticisms of the witnesses”.81 
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79 Kamloops, supra, note 50, at 40. 
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Finally, a clear expression of Justice Wilson’s deference to the 
legislature can be found in her majority decision in Tock v. St. John’s 
Metropolitan Area Board,82 a case that raised the question of whether a 
municipality could rely upon the defence of statutory authority in a 
nuisance case. Although she concluded that, on the facts of the case, the 
defence was not available to the defendant municipality, she was not 
willing to reformulate it along the lines urged by her colleague LaForest 
J. in his concurring judgment: 
I do not, however, share La Forest J.’s view that this Court should, or 
indeed can, on this appeal virtually abolish the defence of statutory 
authority for policy reasons and treat municipalities exercising 
statutory authority in the same way as private individuals. Such a 
major departure from the current state of the law would, it seems to 
me, require the intervention of the legislature.83 
2. Principle 
I am using the term “principle” here in reference to form and to 
substance. At the level of form, considerable overlap with the foregoing 
will immediately be apparent. For when we speak of “principled 
decision-making”, generally we are referring, at least in part, to making 
decisions consistent with precedent. In Ronald Dworkin’s liberal 
philosophy, this is “law as integrity”: 
Law as integrity asks a judge deciding a common-law case . . . to think 
of himself as an author in the chain of common law. He knows that 
other judges have decided cases that, although not exactly like this 
case, deal with related problems; he must think of their decisions as 
part of a long story he must interpret and then continue, according to 
his own judgment of how to make the developing story as good as it 
can be. (Of course the best story for him means best from the 
standpoint of political morality, not aesthetics.) . . . The judge’s 
decision — his post-interpretive conclusions — must be drawn from an 
interpretation that both fits and justifies what has gone before, so far as 
that is possible. 84  
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83 Id., at 1204.  
84 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986), at 238 
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In a number of the cases discussed above in which Justice Wilson 
incrementally expanded tort law, her decision-making process can be 
characterized as comporting with Dworkin’s description of law as 
integrity. For example, in Crocker, to arrive at the conclusion that the 
defendant ski resort did owe a positive duty to the plaintiff, she had to 
address prior cases that differentiated between nonfeasance and 
misfeasance: “The early common law was reluctant to recognize 
affirmative duties to act. Limited exceptions were carved out where the 
parties were in a special relationship (e.g. parent and child) or where the 
defendant had a statutory or contractual obligation to intervene.”85 She 
noted the increasing willingness of Canadian courts to expand the 
categories of special relationship that constitute exceptions.86 But rather 
than simply carving out another exception, she sought to rationalize the 
established exceptions and to link the facts of Crocker to them by 
identifying the principle that unites them:  
. . . The common thread running through these cases is that one is 
under a duty not to place another person in a position where it is 
foreseeable that that person could suffer injury. The plaintiff’s inability 
to handle the situation in which he or she has been placed — either 
through youth, intoxication or other incapacity — is an element in 
determining how foreseeable the injury is.87  
Returning to Dworkin’s explanation of law as integrity, remember 
that the goal of this decision-making process is to create “the best story”, 
that is, the “best from the standpoint of political morality”.88 This is 
where substance comes into it. Best from the standpoint of political 
morality will be the decision that best comports with liberal principles 
such as autonomy, equality, and fairness. 
These are values that Justice Wilson embraced. The complication is 
that though these values are sometimes complementary, at other times 
they are in tension with one another. In negotiating such tensions, Justice 
Wilson espoused a complex, nuanced liberalism. A closer look at the 
vision of autonomy that emerges from her tort decisions is illustrative 
here. 
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In such decisions as Dominion Chain,89 Justice Wilson evidenced a 
very traditional liberal notion of autonomy. She conceived of the 
contracting parties in that case as equals who had arrived at a consensual 
agreement. Thus, in her view, respecting their autonomy required giving 
effect to that consensual agreement by keeping potentially conflicting 
tort duties out of the equation. This determination in this context is very 
much in line with a number of her corporate law decisions which 
Maureen Maloney has criticized as bordering on libertarian.90 
But this starkly individualist vision of autonomy is tempered in other 
judgments. For example, in Crocker, the defendant ski resort and the 
plaintiff were both private actors in the marketplace as well, and, in 
arguing that there ought not to be a positive duty here, or that, in the 
alternative, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk ought to apply, 
the defendant sought to establish a consensual relationship between 
equals, the terms of which (as embodied in the waiver form the plaintiff 
had signed) ought to be given effect. Justice Wilson did not see the 
relationship that way: 
. . . The fact that Crocker was an irresponsible individual and was 
voluntarily intoxicated during the tubing competition is the very reason 
why Sundance was legally obliged to take all reasonable steps to 
prevent Crocker from competing. While it may be acceptable for a ski 
resort to allow or encourage sober able-bodied individuals to 
participate in dangerous recreational activities, it is not acceptable for 
the resort to open its dangerous competitions to persons who are 
obviously incapacitated. This is, however, what Sundance did when it 
allowed Crocker to compete. I conclude, therefore, that it failed to meet 
its standard of care in the circumstances.91 
Again in Janiak, where the duty of the plaintiff to mitigate was at 
issue, capacity to exercise autonomy was at the heart of the matter for 
Justice Wilson: 
It seems to me that the line must be drawn between those plaintiffs 
who are capable of making a rational decision regarding their own care 
and those who, due to some pre-existing psychological condition, are 
not capable of making such a decision. … Accordingly, non-
pathological but distinctive subjective attributes of the plaintiff’s 
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personality and mental composition are ignored in favour of an 
objective assessment of the reasonableness of his choice. So long as he 
is capable of choice the assumption of tort damages theory must be that 
he himself assumes the cost of any unreasonable decision. … On the 
other hand, if due to some pre-existing psychological condition he is 
incapable of making a choice at all, then he should be treated as falling 
within the thin skull category and should not be made to bear the cost 
once it is established that he has been wrongfully injured.92 
If the plaintiff has the capacity to exercise autonomy, that capacity 
will be given effect, sometimes to the plaintiff’s detriment. If not, 
however, the plaintiff is to be accorded some protection by tort law, here 
under the auspices of the thin skull rule. 
That Justice Wilson’s vision of autonomy extended beyond a 
narrow, individualistic one is particularly apparent when we look at 
decisions involving public authorities as defendants. In Kamloops, for 
example, we see that she did not hesitate to impose positive duties on 
municipalities and municipal employees who have regulatory respon-
sibilities that citizens rely upon them to discharge. Indeed, in other 
decisions such as Crocker, we see Wilson J., ever attentive to context, 
similarly attaching responsibilities dictated by other social roles, for 
example, positive duties imposed on the defendant who is seeking to 
profit from his or her engagement with the plaintiff in a commercial host 
scenario. 
Danielle Pinard has written of Justice Wilson’s “preoccupation with 
a contextual notion of liberty” which is “alive and well only if the state 
not only respects it in a passive way, but protects and promotes it as well 
in a positive way”.93 Wilson’s imposition of positive duties in tort can be 
characterized as a means of protecting and promoting the liberty of 
vulnerable parties in unequal relationships. 
3. Pragmatism 
I am not using the term “pragmatism” here to denote the particular 
school of legal theory that goes by that label, but simply in the ordinary 
sense of the word. Again and again in her tort judgments, we see Justice 
Wilson weighing the practical consequences of opting for one legal 
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solution over another, for the particular parties before her, but also for 
others who will thereafter be affected by shifts in the law.  
For example, one of the concerns animating her dissent in Dominion 
Chain was the importance of certainty in commercial relationships. She 
sought to resolve that case in a way that would allow contracting parties 
the stability of knowing that their relationship would be governed by the 
contractual terms that they had agreed to and that those terms would not 
be rewritten by the intervention of tort law. Similarly, in Tock, she 
expressed concern about the effect that a shift in the law proposed by La 
Forest J. in his concurring judgment would have on the capacity of 
public bodies and citizens to sort out their legal rights and 
responsibilities: 
. . . I do not favour replacing the existing law in this area with a general 
test of whether it is reasonable or unreasonable in the circumstances of 
the case to award compensation. This test may, because of the high 
degree of judicial subjectivity involved in its application, make life 
easier for the judges but, in my respectful view, it will do nothing to 
assist public bodies to make a realistic assessment of their exposure in 
carrying out their statutory mandate. Nor will it provide much guidance 
to litigants in deciding whether or not to sue. It is altogether too 
uncertain.94 
In Kamloops, on the issue relating to limitation periods, in opting for 
the reasonable discoverability rule over the alternative adopted by the 
House of Lords in Pirelli, Wilson J. was in part influenced by the 
practical difficulties she perceived in applying the latter: 
There are obvious problems in applying Pirelli. To what extent does 
physical damage have to have manifested itself? Is a hair-line crack 
enough or does there have to be a more substantial manifestation? And 
what of an owner who discovers that his building is constructed of 
materials which will cause it to collapse in five years time? According 
to Pirelli he has no cause of action until it starts to crumble.95 
And in Fletcher, in outlining the scope of the duty owed to clients by 
public insurers as opposed to private ones, Wilson J. was attentive to 
concrete differences in the set-up of their respective operations and to 
the distinct consumer expectations those differences generated: 
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By the same token, however, there are a number of reasons why the 
public insurer’s duty is less onerous than that of the private agent or 
broker. The institutional setting in which the public insurance is sold 
affords considerably less scope for privacy and individualized attention 
than that provided by a private agency. As the trial judge noted, an 
MPIC employee may serve as many as 60 people a day. Further, the 
employees who serve the customers do not hold themselves out as 
specialists in risk assessment and insurance advice. The service they 
provide is more sales and clerical than that provided by an insurance 
agent.96 
Finally, in Frame,97 in declining to extend the torts of conspiracy and 
intentional infliction of mental suffering into the family law context, 
Wilson J. considered how such tort actions might be employed in the 
middle of the emotionally fraught context of family breakdown, and of 
how adding such tort actions into the mix would affect children, the most 
vulnerable parties in the situation who would have no voice in a private 
tort action between their parents. 
VI. CONCLUSION: JUSTICE WILSON’S TORT PHILOSOPHY 
Having outlined the themes and values that I perceive to be threaded 
through Justice Wilson’s tort decisions, I want to conclude by circling 
back around to the question of what, if any, distinct tort philosophy they 
reveal. For these themes and values are not unique to Justice Wilson’s 
tort decisions, but are evident in her judgments in other areas as well. 
In her judgment in Frame, Wilson J. made reference to an ongoing 
debate about the theoretical basis for tort law which stretches back to the 
19th century. She cited the following passage from Cases and Materials 
on the Law of Torts by Solomon et al. by way of illustration: 
Initially, the search for a theoretical basis for tort law centred on the 
issue of whether there was a general principle of tortious liability. Sir 
John Salmond argued that tort law was merely a patchwork of distinct 
causes of action, each protecting different interests and each based on 
separate principles of liability [see Salmond, The Law of Torts (6th ed., 
1924) at pp. 9-10]. Essentially the law of torts was a finite set of 
independent rules, and the courts were not free to recognize new heads 
of liability. In contrast, writers such as Pollock contended that the law 
of torts was based upon the single unifying principle that all harms 
                                                                                                             
96 [1990] S.C.J. No. 121, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191, at 218 (S.C.C.). 
97 [1987] S.C.J. No. 49, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)  PRECEDENT, PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM 157 
were tortious unless they could be justified [see Pollock, The Law of 
Torts (13th ed., 1929) at p. 21]. The courts were thus free to recognize 
new torts. Glanville Williams suggested a compromise between the 
two viewpoints. He argued that tort law historically exhibited no 
comprehensive theory, but that the existing categories of liability were 
sufficiently flexible to enable tort law to grow and adapt.98 
Justice Wilson allowed that it “would perhaps be interesting for the 
Court to join in this debate”, but for purposes of arriving at a decision on 
the facts before her, she endorsed Glanville Williams’ compromise, 
pronouncing it a “pragmatic resolution” which “correctly characterizes 
the task before the Court when confronted with a heretofore 
unprecedented basis for liability”. 99 She concluded:  
Thus, whatever one considers the theoretical foundation of liability to 
be, it is not enough for the appellant simply to invoke a general 
principle of freedom from harm. Rather, he must show why “existing 
principles of liability may properly be extended”, that is, he must 
identify the nature of the right he invokes and justify its protection.100 
In the discussion of principle above, I linked Justice Wilson to the 
liberal legal philosophy espoused by Ronald Dworkin, but she cannot be 
neatly slotted there when considering her tort decisions as a whole. The 
blending of principle and pragmatism in her decisions of which the 
above statement is emblematic precludes that. Note, for example, that 
Dworkin has categorically stated that Hercules, the super-human judge 
he created to personify law as integrity, rejects the pragmatism that 
would have him weighing policy alongside principle.101 
But considering Justice Wilson’s nuanced, contextualized liberalism, 
which blends principle with pragmatism, and infuses autonomy with 
equality, I think it would be fair to link her tort jurisprudence with tort 
theorists that I have described elsewhere as cautious optimists about the 
progressive potential of tort law.102  
These cautious optimists insist not only that tort can serve an 
educative or symbolic function which fosters equality, but that it must do 
so. Accordingly, they find promise in some of the underlying principles 
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of tort law and in two trends in modern tort law — shifting conceptions 
of autonomy, and the “etherialization” of tort law.103  
Ken Cooper-Stephenson stresses that “tort law locates itself in, and 
is throughout influenced by, a socio-legal context which includes 
important norms of substantive equality”.104 He suggests not only that 
tort law can and should integrate concepts of substantive equality that 
have developed in human rights law, but that it already has.105 He asserts 
that tort law frequently “serves to redistribute collective wealth for the 
benefit of the underprivileged and disadvantaged at the expense of the 
privileged and the advantaged” through the way threshold questions of 
duty and tort obligation are constructed and answered.106 This is evident 
in determinations of what counts as a loss for purposes of tort law, in the 
choice of fault requirements for different relationships and, finally, in the 
types of relationships which tort law recognizes as significant in the 
imposition of duties.107 He concedes that at one time tort law concerned 
itself primarily with protecting the advantaged, by virtue of their status 
as property owners, but asserts that tort law’s distributive sympathies 
have changed gradually to address the interests of the underprivileged 
and powerless.108 He concludes: “In short, a tort remedy is corrective at 
its core but is set in a distributive egalitarian context which drives its 
content.”109 
Martin Kotler tracks the development of a shift away from the 
primacy of property concerns in American tort law which supports 
Cooper-Stephenson’s point. Kotler asserts that American tort law is 
currently “between paradigms”, but that autonomy has been and remains 
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its primary goal. The change that has occurred has been in the way that 
autonomy is conceived: “Although at one time protection of autonomy 
was understood primarily in terms of protection of private property 
rights, now the societal and legal perception of autonomy focuses on the 
protection of one’s bodily integrity.”110 
In support of his thesis, Kotler points to the fact that preventative 
remedies are now available to protect individuals from bodily invasion 
in advance, for example, in the context of domestic violence, whereas 
before-the-fact remedies are no longer as readily available to protect 
private property from damage.111 Putting bodily integrity at the core of 
autonomy in place of property interests necessarily compels tort law in a 
more egalitarian direction. At the very least, it affords tort protection to a 
broader range of people. 
Nancy Levit describes a process of the progressive “etherealization” 
of tort law which, I would contend, marks a further evolution in 
conceptions of autonomy beyond bodily integrity to emotional integrity. 
She points to the recent trend toward successful claims for intangible and 
emotional injuries, claims to which courts have not traditionally been 
receptive because of social and legal devaluation of the injuries which 
give rise to them.112  
A number of Justice Wilson’s judgments can be characterized as 
having furthered the shift in conceptions of autonomy that underpin tort 
doctrine and also the etherealization of tort law. In her tort judgments, 
she conceptualizes autonomy in a contextualized way that is attuned to 
the varying capacities of individuals and to the inequalities that may be 
present in the relationships and in the broader social contexts within 
which those individuals are embedded. Further, her conception of the 
legal interests which tort law ought to protect expands well beyond 
interests in property and in bodily integrity to encompass the dignitary 
harms of which the plaintiff in Bhadauria113 complained. Certainly an 
interest in equality animates Justice Wilson’s tort decisions, whether she 
is opting to expand tort liability or to hold the line. To expand tort law 
by creating a tort of discrimination in Bhadauria served the goal of 
equality, whereas to expand the tort of conspiracy into the family law 
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context in Frame114 would have been to compromise equality by 
worsening the situation of the most vulnerable parties in the equation, 
the children. 
While few would suggest that tort law can play a pivotal role in 
correcting injustice and inequality in society, it does constitute one of the 
tools available in that larger quest. Cooper-Stephenson states: 
Although tort law is unlikely to be the primary mechanism for the 
development of an appropriate balance between the advantaged and 
disadvantaged in Canadian society — of a more generalized just 
distribution of rights, entitlements and rewards — tort law nevertheless 
forms part of a structure of norms that can be moulded and cultivated 
in a principled way to further implement substantive justice.115 
Throughout her career, Justice Wilson demonstrated a commitment 
to implementing substantive justice. In her role as a judge, tort law was 
just one of the tools available to her by which to pursue that 
commitment. In instances when she found it to be poorly suited to the 
task, she turned to other means. But when she judged it an appropriate 
and effective tool, she did not hesitate to employ it to achieve reform, 
whether bold or incremental. In so doing, she produced a body of tort 
jurisprudence from which those who maintain a cautious optimism about 
the progressive potential of tort law can draw some inspiration. 
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